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Abstract 
We examine whether the increased creditor protection under the 2005 Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) affects suppliers’ 
provision of trade credit to their customers with high default risk. Employing a 
difference-in-differences analysis for a sample of U.S. public firms during 2002-2008, 
we find that suppliers whose customers have high default risk extend more trade 
credit after BAPCPA. We also find that this relation exists when suppliers have 
stronger reliance on their customers. Overall, our results indicate that the increased 
creditor protection in bankruptcy induces suppliers to offer more trade credit to 
customers with high default risk during the ordinary course of business. Our findings 
have policy implications given the heated debate over the BAPCPA’s effect on 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy process.  
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1. Introduction 
     Trade credit is created when a supplier sells goods to a customer and allows the 
customer to make the payment within a certain period after delivery. As one of the 
most important sources of short-term financing for the buyers, trade credit is widely 
used in normal business. In the U.S., more than 70% of firms use trade credit in their 
ordinary business (Petersen and Rajan, 1997), and accounts receivable derived from 
trade credit account for 15% of the assets of non-financial U.S. firms (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1993). Similar to bank credit, trade credit is also one type of private credit, 
but it is significantly different from bank credit as suppliers deliver goods rather than 
money to customers and customers’ bankruptcy risk has a profound influence on 
suppliers’ decisions and performance (Yang et al., 2015). 
On the one hand, different from financial institutions, suppliers and customers are 
intimate stakeholders in the supply chain, with the former in the upstream and the 
latter in the downstream. Once a customer collapses, it may be difficult for a supplier 
to replace this customer with a new one (Cunat, 2007). In addition, the 
relationship-specific investments that the supplier made will be of useless once the 
customer goes bankrupt,1 and deploying these investments will result in a huge loss 
to the supplier (Cunat, 2007; Wilner, 2000). Therefore, relative to financial 
institutions, a supplier has an additional interest in the customer, which is called the 
                              
1 The relationship-specific investment can take different forms. It could be a supplier’s investment into 
the production of goods that are tailored to meet the specific needs of the customer (e.g., building a 
factory close to the customer, or purchasing special machinery), or intangible assets that are specific to 
the relationship (e.g., acquiring specific technology) (Dass et al., 2015). The considerable time that the 
salesperson spent with the customer and other point-of-sale efforts may also create a specific 
non-salvageable investment in the relationship (Ng et al., 1999). 
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debtor in a bankruptcy case, because the supplier considers not only the uncollected 
accounts receivable but also the potential profits from selling its goods (Ng et al., 
1999). For this reason, suppliers may be more willing to extend trade credit to 
financially distressed customers to help them overcome temporary financial 
difficulties (e.g., Ng et al., 1999; Wilner, 2000; Gunat, 2007; Dass et al., 2015).  
On the other hand, financial institutions can set up covenants to safeguard their 
benefits, including requiring collateral and other restrictive covenants, while trade 
credit extended by suppliers is unsecured creditor right (Li and Tang, 2016). 
According to the United States Bankruptcy Code, only after all secured creditors have 
been paid, unsecured creditors could ask for payment. In most circumstances, 
unsecured creditors will get little repayment in a reorganization bankruptcy or when 
firms file for liquidation (Teloni, 2014). Consequently, suppliers extending trade 
credit to customers with high default risk may have to write-off their accounts 
receivable and thus bear huge credit loss once the customers are eventually liquidated 
after failed attempts to reorganize2 (Cunat, 2007; Wilner, 2000). Therefore, suppliers 
may be very cautious when extending trade credit to customers with high default risk.  
According to the power theory of credit, the legal protection of creditors in 
bankruptcy will induce financial institutions to extend private credit to firms (Djankov 
et al., 2007; Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998; Townsend, 1979). Moreover, using a 
sample of 127 countries, Djankov et al. (2007) find that the role of legal protection of 
                              
2 As will be discussed in Section 2, under the U.S. bankruptcy laws, a company can file for bankruptcy 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, or file for a liquidation 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7. 
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creditor rights in encouraging lenders to extend private credit is more important in 
richer countries. Given the great divergence between bank credit and trade credit, is 
the power theory of credit also applicable to trade credit? This paper attempts to 
address this unexplored issue. 
To identify an exogenous increase in suppliers’ power, we exploit the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA hereafter) as an 
exogenous shock, and construct a difference-in-differences research design to 
examine the effect of increased supplier power on the trade credit supply. Prior to 
2005, bankruptcy in the U.S. was largely governed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, which has long been viewed debtor friendly. In practice, bankruptcy courts 
usually prefer to protect the filing company’s benefit (i.e., the debtor’s benefit) at the 
cost of creditors’ benefits (Birge et al., 2014; Franks et al., 1996; Ravid and Sundgren, 
1998; Teloni, 2014). However, BAPCPA breaks out this situation because it 
significantly changes the power balance between the debtor and creditors in 
bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Teloni, 
2014). This amendment is more creditor friendly, and enhances the bargaining power 
of creditors in general, suppliers in particular, when a debtor files for reorganization 
(Mazur, 2014; Teloni, 2014). 
The passage of BAPCPA has triggered a heated debate over its effect on Chapter 
11 bankruptcy. Some law scholars argue that BAPCPA improves the efficiency of 
bankruptcy process, which had been lengthy and burdensome (Williams, 2009), while 
others argue that BAPCPA makes reorganization more difficult and burdensome for 
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debtors (Miller, 2007). The debate also motivates us to provide empirical evidence on 
whether BAPCPA has some positive effect on debtors before they file for bankruptcy. 
As BAPCPA mainly concerned insolvent customers, it has little influence on 
financially healthy customers. We use Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) expected 
default risk (EDF) developed from Merton’s (1974) distance to default to measure 
customers’ default risk. We calculate the weighted average EDF of each supplier’s 
major customers (labeled as CEDF), where the weight is a major customer’s purchase 
from the supplier divided by the supplier’s total sales. We then classify suppliers into 
two groups based on their CEDF scores in 2004: the treatment group consists of 
suppliers whose CEDF scores are in the top quintile (i.e., suppliers whose major 
customers have high default risk; we label these customers as near-insolvent 
customers), and the control group includes suppliers whose CEDF scores are in the 
bottom quintile (i.e., suppliers whose major customers have low default risk). Using 
the trade credit data three years prior to and three years following BAPCPA, we first 
examine whether suppliers with higher CEDF scores extend more trade credit after 
BAPCPA. We find that, relative to the control group, suppliers in the treatment group 
(i.e., suppliers whose major customers have high default risk) extend more trade 
credit after BAPCPA, indicating that the power theory of credit not only applies to 
bank credit provided by financial institutions (Townsend, 1979; Aghion and Bolton, 
1992; Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007), but also 
applies to trade credit offered by suppliers.  
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We then perform parallel trend analysis and confirm that the differences in trade 
credit extended by suppliers in the post-BAPCPA period cannot be attributed to the 
trending differences between the treatment and control groups in the pre-BAPCPA 
period, which further supports our conclusion. Our baseline result is also robust to 
additional tests using Altman’s (1968) Z-score to measure customers’ expected 
default risk, using both shorter and longer sample periods (i.e., one-year, two-year and 
four-year windows around the passage of BPACPA), and using two alternative 
measures of trade credit.  
We next test whether the effect of increased creditor power under BAPCPA on 
trade credit supply depends on suppliers’ reliance on customers. Provided that a 
supplier is highly dependent on a major customer, it is costly to lose this customer 
(e.g., Cunat, 2007; Dass et al., 2015; Wilner, 2000). Prior to BAPCPA, due to the high 
switching costs, a supplier had to make great concession in bankruptcy reorganization 
(e.g., waiving a substantial portion of unpaid amount) to maintain its relationship with 
the customer (Cunat, 2007; Wilner, 2000). BAPCPA increases creditor rights in 
bankruptcy, thereby reducing their loss in reorganization. Therefore, suppliers with 
higher switching costs benefit more from BAPCPA, and thus are more willing to 
extend trade credit to their near-insolvent customers to help them overcome financial 
difficulties. Following prior literature (Banerjee et al., 2008; Bowen et al., 1995; 
Fabbri and Klapper, 2016; Li and Tang, 2016), we consider three attributes of the 
supply-chain relationship that are deemed to influence a supplier’s dependence on its 
major customers: (i) the sales concentration to major customers; (ii) whether the 
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supplier is in durable goods industry; and (iii) the product market competition in the 
supplier’s industry. Consistent with our predictions, we find that suppliers with higher 
CEDF scores extend more trade credit to their customers after BAPCPA only when 
they are highly dependent on their customers.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several respects. First, our study extends 
the literature that examines whether the legal protection of creditor rights affects 
corporate debt financing. Prior studies report that the legal environment influences 
corporate external financing (La Porta et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1998), and a more 
debtholder-oriented legal environment will induce financial institutions to extend 
more credit to borrowers (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Djankov et al., 2007; Hart and 
Moore, 1994, 1998; Townsend, 1979). Different from bank credit provided by 
financial institutions, trade credit provided by suppliers is also an important form of 
private credit. In essence, what suppliers lend is what they sell (Giannetti et al., 2011). 
Our study shows that the power theory of credit documented in the prior literature 
applies to trade credit as well.  
Second, our study adds to the extant theoretical and empirical work that explains 
why trade credit exists. Some theories posit that suppliers have an information 
advantage over banks (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Frank and Maksimovic, 1998; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1997; Smith, 1987). Other explanations are based on moral 
hazard faced by the buyer (Babich and Tang, 2012; Kim and Shin, 2012; Lee and 
Stowe, 1993; Long et al., 1993), moral hazard faced by the supplier (Burkart and 
Ellingsen, 2004), price discrimination between customers with different levels of 
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creditworthiness (Brennan et al., 1988), transaction costs (Emery, 1987; Ferris, 1981), 
supply chain coordination efficiency (Kouvelis and Zhao, 2012; Yang and Birge, 
2011), or competition in suppliers (Chod, 2017; Fisman and Raturi, 2004; McMillan 
and Woodruff, 1999). Yang et al. (2015) develop theoretical models to analyze the 
supply-chain effects of bankruptcy. However, little attention has been paid to whether 
increased supplier power in bankruptcy affects the provision of trade credit to 
near-insolvent firms during the ordinary course of business. Taking advantage of 
BAPCPA as an exogenous shock, our empirical results provide initial evidence on 
this issue, and enhance our understanding of legal factors that influence the trade 
credit provision.  
Third, our study also belongs to the line of research that examines the effect of the 
2005 BAPCPA and carries important policy implications. Current literature mainly 
focuses on the effect of BAPCPA on market reactions to the bankruptcy 
announcements (Coelho, 2010), capital investments of U.S. airlines (Mazur, 2014), 
and sales of debtors’ assets during bankruptcy process and debtors’ likelihood of 
emergence (Teloni, 2014). To our best knowledge, our paper is the first to study the 
spillover effect of BAPCPA along the supply chain, that is, we examine the 
BAPCPA’s effect on trade credit offered by suppliers to customers. Our results 
indicate that increased creditor bargaining power in bankruptcy encourages suppliers 
to provide more trade credit to near-insolvent customers in the ordinary course of 
business, which may help these customers to overcome temporary financial 
difficulties and reduce their bankruptcy risk. In contrast to the concerns that BAPCPA 
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puts debtors at disadvantage during bankruptcy reorganization, our findings shed light 
on the positive effect of BAPCPA on debtors before filing for bankruptcy. Our 
findings will be of interest to regulators concerned about the benefits and costs of 
increased creditor power in bankruptcy. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the key changes 
of creditor rights under BAPCPA and develops our hypothesis; Section 3 describes 
the sample selection, research design and descriptive statistics; Section 4 tests our 
hypothesis and reports the baseline and robustness test results; Section 5 presents the 
cross-sectional test results; and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
Firms that are unable to meet their financial obligations can file for bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy does not necessarily mean that a firm is forced to shut down. In the U.S., 
there are two types of bankruptcy: liquidation and reorganization. Liquidation is the 
process by which the filing firm is brought to an end and the assets and property of the 
firm are redistributed to creditors and/or shareholders, while reorganization focuses on 
reducing the filing firm’s debt burden to help it return to normal business operation. 
Prior to 2005, Chapter 7 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act of the United States 
governs the process of liquidation, while Chapter 11 focuses on reorganization. In 
practice, firms usually prefer to file for reorganization rather than liquidation, and 
they file for liquidation when they cannot reach an agreement with creditors in 
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reorganization. According to the issue we want to explore, we mainly focus on 
creditor rights during Chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy.  
The BAPCPA was passed on April 14, 2005 and went into effect on October 17, 
2005. Although it mainly focuses on individual bankruptcy, this amendment also 
includes some modifications and enactments relevant to business bankruptcy 
provisions. Specifically, BAPCPA made several significant changes to Chapter 11 
provisions, which shift the bargaining power from the debtor to creditors. The revised 
Chapter 11 provisions that strengthen creditor rights are outlined below (Mazur, 2014; 
Teloni, 2014). 
(i) Setting a Limit on the Debtor’s Exclusivity Period 
Prior to BAPCPA, under the §1121 provision of Chapter 11, the debtor has a 
120-day period during which it has an exclusive right to file a reorganization plan for 
consideration by stakeholders, and it is given an extra 60 days to solicit acceptances 
(i.e., 180-day exclusivity period to file a plan and have it accepted). Both periods can 
be extended or reduced by the court for cause. In practice, upon the debtor’s requests, 
the court would routinely grant extensions of the exclusivity period, making the 
reorganization process last several years (Teloni, 2014). Therefore, the §1121 
provision, namely, debtor-in-possession provision, grants the debtor the exclusive 
right to file a reorganization plan during a prolonged period, which enables the debtor 
to control the reorganization process to a great extent. In particular, the debtor can use 
the extension of the exclusivity period as undue bargaining leverage to compel 
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creditors to give more concessions. Creditors, anticipating the loss in value of their 
claims due to the delay and in the interest of reaching an agreement, often agree to 
write down debt (Bharath et al., 2014). Accordingly, the more trade credit suppliers 
extend to the debtor, the more credit loss they would bear. Naturally, in anticipation 
of their weak bargaining power in bankruptcy, suppliers would be reluctant to extend 
trade credit to customers with high default risk.  
To reduce the abuse of the exclusivity period, BAPCPA sets a limit of 18 months 
for the exclusivity period, including all extensions, to file a plan, and the total time of 
filing a plan and having it accepted may not be extended beyond 20 months. Once the 
exclusivity period has expired, a creditor or the case trustee may file a competing plan. 
Because of this cap on extensions, the debtor can no longer compel creditors to make 
concessions by threatening to prolong the exclusivity period, which greatly reduces 
the bargaining power of the debtor for waiving debt in reorganization. As such, 
suppliers would bear less credit loss under the new legal regime.  
 (ii) Expanded Reclamation Claim 
Reclamation is the right of a seller to take back goods sold on credit terms to a 
debtor in the ordinary course of the seller's business, not realizing that the debtor was 
insolvent at the time it received the goods (Tabb, 2016). The seller must look to 
section §546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and submit a written reclamation demand to 
enforce its reclamation rights.  
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Under former §546(c), a seller qualified for a reclamation claim could exercise 
such right for goods delivered to an insolvent debtor in the ordinary course of 
business within 10 days before the bankruptcy filing. According to the amended 
§546(c), a seller can assert a reclamation claim of goods if the debtor had received 
such goods while insolvent within 45 days before the bankruptcy filing date. As such, 
BAPCPA enhances the reclamation rights of sellers as it expands the reclamation 
reach-back period before the bankruptcy filing from 10 days to 45 days, and gives a 
seller additional time (up to 20 days after the bankruptcy filing) to transmit its 
reclamation command if the 45-day reclamation-demand period expires after the 
bankruptcy filing (Douglas, 2008).  Accordingly, more goods are subject to the 
reclamation right in the post-BAPCPA period, which potentially reduces sellers’ loss. 
Furthermore, any seller failing to provide timely notice of its reclamation claim still is 
entitled to an administrative expense claim under the amended section §503 (b) (9) for 
goods received by the debtor 20 days before the bankruptcy filing.  
(iii) Elevating Pre-Petition Trade Claims 
Prior to confirmation of a reorganization plan, which outlines debt repayment and 
restructuring, the bankruptcy court will enforce an “administrative solvency” test, 
stipulated by section §1129 (a) (9) (A) of the Bankruptcy Code. A reorganization plan 
can be approved only if the debtor can make full cash payment of all administrative 
expenses by the plan’s effective date, and creditors’ unsecured claims will not be 
negotiated and paid until the reorganization plan is adopted.  
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Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, administrative expenses were limited to 
post-petition operational expenditures plus direct expenditures relevant to the 
reorganization procedure itself (Teloni, 2014). BAPCPA adds certain type of 
suppliers’ pre-petition claims to administrative expenses. Specifically, section §503 (b) 
(9) allows the value of any goods, sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of business 
and received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement of a case, 
as an administrative expense claim. Different from the requirements for a reclamation 
claim, it does not require that the debtor was insolvent at the time receiving the goods, 
and a writing demand is not needed for an administrative expense claim. Therefore, 
before BAPCPA, the suppliers’ pre-petition claims satisfying the above criteria were 
treated as general unsecured claims and thus suppliers may receive nothing. In 
contrast, after BAPCPA, these claims can be treated as administrative expense claims. 
Consequently, suppliers will be paid 100% of the value of the goods delivered in the 
20-day period before the debtor’s bankruptcy, and suppliers may demand prompt 
payment even before the confirmation of the plan. Undoubtedly, this new provision 
benefits suppliers as it substantially increases both the amount and timeliness of the 
payments for goods delivered and received by the debtor within 20 days before the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing date.  
(iv) Making It Easier for Creditors to Achieve Conversion or Dismissal of the 
Chapter 11 Process 
Under certain circumstances, a debtor in a case under Chapter 11 has a one-time 
absolute right to convert the Chapter 11 case to a case under Chapter 7, but it does not 
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have an absolute right to have the case dismissed upon request. A party in interest 
may file a motion to dismiss or convert a Chapter 11 reorganization case to a Chapter 
7 liquidation case “for cause”.3 Prior to 2005, according to the former section §1121 
of Bankruptcy Code, the court had discretionary authority to convert or dismiss a 
Chapter 11 case. BAPCPA modified section §1121. Under the new amendment, the 
court must convert or dismiss the case, unless it specially identifies unusual 
circumstances establishing that the requested conversion or dismissal is not in the best 
interests of the creditors. Obviously, the new section §1121 greatly restricts the 
discretionary authority of the court. If creditors find evidence that the ongoing 
restructuring is substantially harmful to them and then file a motion to convert or 
dismiss a Chapter 11 case, it is now easier for them to win. Therefore, the new section
§1121 increases the bargaining power of creditors (including suppliers) in the 
reorganization process. Suppliers with stronger bargaining power in reorganization 
process will make less concession (Cunat, 2007).  
To summarize, BAPCPA made several significant changes to Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Code. The expansion of sellers’ reclamation claim and elevation of 
pre-petition trade claims as administrative expense claims allow the suppliers 
repossess the goods delivered to the debtor or get fully paid for the value of delivered 
goods, if certain criteria are satisfied. The cap on the debtor’s exclusivity period and 
the restriction of the discretionary authority of the bankruptcy court when dealing 
                              
3 The following website provides some examples of cause: 
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics. 
Accessed on June 30, 2017. 
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with a dismissal or conversion motion grant creditors more bargaining leverage 
against the debtor, and thus provide better protection of supplier rights for goods that 
are not qualified for reclamation or administrative expense claims. Together, these 
creditor-friendly amendments provide stronger creditor (supplier, in particular) 
protection during a reorganization bankruptcy. Therefore, we expect that, in 
anticipation of the stronger supplier rights in bankruptcy after the enactment of 
BAPCPA, suppliers tend to be more willing to extend trade credit to customers with 
high default risk during their normal course of business. Therefore, we develop the 
following hypothesis stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis: Suppliers extend more trade credit to customers with high default 
risk after the passage of BAPCPA.  
  
3. Sample Selection and Research Design 
3.1 Data Sources and Sample 
SEC Regulation S-K Item 101 requires firms whose sales to a single customer 
exceed 10% of total sales to disclose that customer’s identity. Following Campello et 
al. (2016), we identify firms’ major customers using Compustat Segment Customer 
database only if they account for at least 10% of the total sales of a given firm. We 
obtain financial statement data from Compustat and stock price data from CRSP. Our 
sample period covers from 2002 to 2008. Following prior literature, we exclude 2005 
as BAPCPA took effect in that year. Therefore, our main analysis focuses on two 
periods, 2002-2004 and 2006-2008 (i.e., three years before and after the 2005 
BAPCPA). We exclude firms in financial (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities 
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industries (SIC code 4900-4999). As BAPCPA only applies to firms incorporating in 
the U.S., we exclude firms that do not incorporate in the U.S. We require customers to 
have EDF score in 2004, and classify suppliers into treatment (control) group if the 
weighted-average EDF scores of their major customers (i.e., CEDF) are in the top 
(bottom) quintile. We drop observations with negative values for sales, cost of goods 
and total assets, and observations with missing value for the dependent and control 
variables. We further require that firms have at least one observation in both pre- and 
post-BAPCPA periods. This procedure yields a sample of 1,531 firm-year 
observations and 273 unique firms.4 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2 Research Design 
We use a difference-in-differences approach across two dimensions, i.e., the 
proximity to bankruptcy status and pre- versus post-BAPCPA, to explore whether 
suppliers extend more trade credit to their near-insolvent customers after BAPCPA. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression model to test our hypothesis: 
TCit = β0 + β1HCEDF×Post + Control variables + Firm FE + Year FE + ε  (1) 
where, the dependent variable, TC, is the trade credit that suppliers extend to their 
customers. Following previous literature (Giannetti et al., 2011; Petersen and Rajan, 
                              
4 Our sample selection procedure follows the approach used by Aier, Chen, and Pevzner (2014). Since we drop 
observations with missing values and firms that only appear in either pre- or post-BAPCPA period from the 
combined sample of treatment and control groups constructed based on suppliers’ 2004 CEDF scores the final 
sample that we use to test our hypothesis contains uneven number observations for the treatment group and control 
group.  
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1997), we define trade credit extended by supplier i, TCi, as the ratio of the supplier's 
accounts receivable to its sales. POST is an indicator variable, which equals 1 for the 
post-BAPCPA period 2006-2008, and 0 for the pre-BAPCPA period 2002-2004. 
Following Bharath and Shumway (2008), we calculate EDF based on Merton (1974) 
model to develop our measure of bankruptcy risk for each customer. Given that a 
supplier may have multiple major customers, we aggregate customer level variable to 
the supplier level. Specifically, we calculate the weighted average EDF (i.e., CEDF) 
for each supplier, where the weight is a major customer’s purchase from the supplier 
divided by the supplier’s total sales. Because 2004 is the last pre-BAPCPA full year 
in our analysis, we construct the near-insolvent indicator, HCEDF, based on 
suppliers’ CEDF scores in 2004. HCEDF equals 1 if a supplier’s CEDF score is in the 
top quintile of its distribution (i.e., treatment sample – suppliers whose major 
customers are near insolvent), and 0 if a supplier’s CEDF score in 2004 is in the 
bottom quintile (i.e., control sample – suppliers whose customers are further away 
from insolvency). Consistent with prior literature (Aier et al., 2014; Huang et al., 
2016), HCEDF only varies cross-sectionally in our model, as we need to fix the 
near-insolvent status at the 2004 level to conduct the difference-in-differences 
analyses. Our variable of interest is the interaction term, HCEDF*POST, and we 
predict β1 to be positive. Given that our model controls for firm- and year-fixed 
effects, we do not include HCEDF or POST as HCEDF is absorbed in firm-fixed 
effects and POST is absorbed in year-fixed effects (Huang et al., 2016).  
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Following prior studies (e.g., Chod, 2017; Dass et al., 2015; Petersen and Rajan, 
1997), we include several control variables that may influence suppliers’ provision of 
trade credit. Specifically, we control for firm size (Size) as larger suppliers tend to 
extend more trade credit. We also include firm profitability (Profitability). On the one 
hand, more profitable firms may be able to offer more trade credit. On the other hand, 
profitability may be positively related to the supplier’s market power, which may 
limit its willingness to provide financing (e.g., Chod et al., 2016). We also control for 
suppliers’ cash holdings (Cashhold) and trade credit that suppliers received (TC_ap) 
as they affect firm liquidity. Firms with more cash holdings will be able to extend 
more trade credit, but more cash holdings may be the result of extending little trade 
credit (i.e., from cash sales). Therefore, we do not make a directional prediction for 
Cashhold. Firms that receive more trade credit and thus can delay the payment of 
their purchases (resulting in accounts payable on the balance sheet) will be able to 
extend more trade credit to their customers, so we predict the coefficient on TC_ap to 
be positive.  
We include firms’ R&D investment (RD) as a proxy for relationship-specific 
investments. Suppliers that have made relationship-specific investments are more 
willing to extend trade credit to customers, leading to a positive relation between the 
two. We also control for asset tangibility (Tangibility). On the one hand, firms with 
more tangible assets have higher capacity to use these assets as collateral to obtain 
debt financing, and therefore, they should be able to offer more trade credit. On the 
other hand, firms with more tangible assets have fewer liquid assets; accordingly, they 
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would tend to offer less trade credit. Therefore, we do not make a prediction on the 
sign of Tangibility. Furthermore, we expect that highly levered firms (Leverage) and 
financially constrained firms (i.e., firms with higher HP index) are less likely to 
extend trade credit, while firms with higher Standard & Poor’s credit rating (Rating), 
older firms (LnAge), and firms paying high dividends (Dividend) are less likely to be 
financially constrained, and therefore, they tend to offer more trade credit.  
The last set of control variables are related to firm growth. Firms with higher 
market-to-book ratio (MB) and firms that want to keep high growth of sales 
(Growth_sale) tend to offer more trade credit to customers to boost their sales. 
Appendix A provides the definitions of all these variables. To reduce the effect of 
outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the distributions of our sample (including the treatment and control 
groups) across the Fama-French 12 industries and each year in our sample period. The 
majority of our observations are from Business Equipment (36.45%) and 
Manufacturing (16.85%) industries. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of main variables. The mean 
and median values of TC are 0.152 and 0.139, respectively, which are generally 
comparable to those reported by Dass, Kale, and Nanda (2014) (mean 0.178 and 
median 0.165) and Chod, Lyandres and Yang (2016) (mean 0.20 and median 0.161).  
Our primary interest lies in examining whether the differential trade credit offered 
by the treatment group relative to the control group shifts after BAPCPA. This 
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difference-in-differences analysis mitigates the impact of any pre-existing divergence 
between the treatment and control groups. As shown in Panel B of Table 2, the 
difference in the average TC between the treatment and control groups enlarged 
significantly subsequent to the enactment of BAPCPA. This univariate test result 
indicates that suppliers with higher CEDF scores extended more trade credit to their 
customers after BAPCPA, which is a preliminary evidence of our prediction. As to 
the other explanatory variables, none of them exhibits a significant differential shift 
after BAPCPA. 
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
    Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix of key variables. TC is positively 
correlated with HCEDF at the 1% level. Given that there is no significant difference 
between TC extended by the treatment group and control group in the pre-BAPCPA 
period as shown in Panel B of Table 2, the positive correlation between TC and 
HCEDF must be driven by the post-BAPCPA period, implying that suppliers with 
higher CEDF scores extend more trade credit after BAPCPA. As predicted, TC_ap, 
MB, and Growth_sale are positively correlated with TC, and Leverage is negatively 
correlated with TC. The negative correlations between Cashhold and TC and between 
Profitability and TC indicate that firms with more cash holdings and higher 
profitability ratio exhibit lower level of outstanding trade credit. Unexpectedly, the 
correlations between TC and three variables, HP, Dividend and RD, are not 
statistically significant. Contrary to our prediction, Size is negatively correlated with 
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TC. All these correlations are only suggestive of the underlying relationships because 
other variables potentially affecting TC are not controlled for. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Baseline regression results 
      In this section, we investigate whether suppliers with higher CEDF scores 
extend more trade credit to their customers after BAPCPA, and report the results in 
Table 4. Column (1) of Table 4 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1) without 
control variables but with firm- and year-fixed effects. We find that the coefficient on 
HCEDF*Post is positive (0.0151) and statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
column (2), after including control variables, the coefficient on HCEDF*POST 
remains positive (0.0145) and significant at the 1% level, indicating that suppliers 
with higher CEDF scores extend more trade credit to their customers after BAPCPA. 
This result is consistent with our prediction that increased creditor protection in 
bankruptcy induces suppliers to offer more trade credit to near-insolvent customers. 
Recall that the mean value of our dependent variable TC is 0.1564 for the treatment 
sample in the pre-BAPCPA period, as shown in Panel B of Table 2. Thus, our 
estimated coefficient on HCEDF*POST in column (2) of Table 4 suggests that an 
average treatment firm provides 9.3% (0.0145/0.1564) more trade credit to its 
customers after BAPCPA, indicating that the influence of BAPCPA on trade credit 
supply is economically significant. 
       21 
Regarding the control variables, consistent with Chod et al. (2016), we find that 
suppliers with more cash holdings (Cashhold), more relationship-specific investments 
(RD) and higher tangible assets ratio (Tangibility) extend less trade credit. As 
predicted, we find that suppliers with higher accounts payable (TC_ap) (i.e., receiving 
more trade credit from their suppliers), higher dividend payments and higher 
market-to-book ratio (MB) extend more trade credit. The coefficients on Leverage and 
Growth_sales have the predicted sign, but they are insignificant at conventional levels 
based on two-tailed t-statistics (they are significant at the 10% level based on 
one-tailed test only, which are not tabulated). We do not find significant results on 
Size, Profitability, HP, Rating and LnAge, even though some of them have the 
predicted sign. Overall, the sign and significance level of many of our control 
variables are largely consistent with prior studies (Chod et al., 2016; Dass et al., 
2015). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.2 Parallel Trend Analysis 
    Provided that BAPCPA indeed influences suppliers’ willingness to extend trade 
credit to near-insolvent customers during their normal course of business, we should 
find no obvious difference in the trade credit supply between the treatment group and 
control group in years prior to BAPCPA, and such a difference should only appear 
after BAPCPA. To further strengthen our evidence, in this section, we examine the 
parallel trend effect (i.e., whether the differences between trade credit extended by 
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suppliers in the treatment group and control group exhibit any persistent trend) by 
estimating the following regression. 
  


YearFEFirmFEControlsDummyYEARHCEDFTC
year
year
iti _*
2008
2003
0,  (2) 
Following Huang et al. (2016), we take 2002, the first year in our sample, as the 
benchmark year. The variables of interest are the interaction terms between HCEDF 
and indicator variable for each year during 2003-2008 (excluding 2005 when 
BAPCPA took effect). All other variables are defined as in Eq. (1). As shown in Table 
5, there is no significant relative shift between the treatment group and control group 
with respect to the change in trade credit supply in 2003 and 2004, while there is a 
significant shift post-BAPCPA, especially in 2006 and 2007, which supports the 
inference we made from the main results reported in Table 4. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 Shortened/expanded sample period  
To check whether our baseline results are robust to the selection of sample period, 
we re-estimate Eq. (1) using different sample periods. First, we test our hypothesis 
using two shortened sample periods, 2004-2006 (i.e., one-year window before and 
after BAPCPA, excluding 2005) and 2003-2007 (i.e., two-year window before and 
after BAPCPA, excluding 2005), respectively. As shown in columns (1) and (2) in 
Panel A of Table 6, the coefficient on HCEDF*POST is still positive (0.0114 and 
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0.0157), significant at the 10% level, respectively. Second, we expand our sample 
period to 2001-2009 (four-year window before and after BAPCPA, excluding 2005). 
As shown in column (3) in Panel A of Table 6, the coefficient on HCEDF*POST is 
positive (0.0184), significant at the 1% level. Taken together, the results using one-, 
two- and four-year windows are consistent with our baseline results using three-year 
window as reported in Table 4, indicating that our finding is not driven by the 
selection of sample period. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
4.3.2 Alternative measure of proximity to insolvency 
In our baseline analysis, we use Bharath and Shumway (2008)’s EDF to measure 
customers’ expected insolvency risk. In this section, we test our hypothesis using an 
alternative measure of proximity to insolvency: Altman’s (1968) Z-Score. Similar to 
the construction method of CEDF, we calculate the Altman’s (1968) Z-Score for each 
major customer of a supplier, and then construct the weighted average Z-Score for 
each supplier (CZscore), where the weight is a major customer’s purchase from the 
supplier divided by the supplier’s total sales. As lower Z-Score indicates higher 
default risk, based on suppliers’ CZscore values in 2004, we put suppliers whose 
CZscore values are in the bottom quintile into the treatment group, and put suppliers 
whose CZscore values are in the top quintile into the control group.5 We generate an 
indicator variable, HCZscore, which equals 1 for suppliers in the treatment group, and 
                              
5 The sample size is 1,694, larger than the sample used in the main tests, because Altman’s (1968) Z-score has 
fewer missing values than EDF.  
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0 for suppliers in the control group, and then replace HCEDF*POST in Eq. (1) with 
HCZscore*POST. As shown in column (1) of Panel B of Table 6, the coefficient on 
HCZscore*POST is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level based on 
two-tailed t-statistics, consistent with the result on HCEDF*POST in Table 4.  
4.3.3 Alternative measures of trade credit 
To check whether our baseline result is robust to the alternative measures of trade 
credit, we use two alternative proxies, TC1 and NTCS, to measure trade credit 
extended by suppliers. TC1 is accounts receivable divided by total assets, and the net 
trade credit surplus (NTCS) is defined as accounts receivable minus accounts payable 
scaled by total assets (Love et al., 2007).6 As shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 
6 Panel B, the coefficient on HCEDF*POST is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% level, respectively, suggesting that our main result is robust to the use 
of these two alternative measures of trade credit. 
5. Cross-sectional analysis: The effect of suppliers’ reliance on customers 
In this section, we explore whether suppliers’ provision of trade credit to their 
near-insolvent customers after BAPCPA depends on their reliance on these customers. 
We expect that suppliers that rely on near-insolvent customers for their business are 
more willing to extend trade credit to help these customers to overcome financial 
difficulties, given the higher protection of creditors under BAPCPA. As explained 
below, we use supplier’s sales percentage to customers, whether the supplier is in the 
                              
6 We exclude TC_ap from the model when NTCS is the dependent variable. 
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durable or non-durable goods industry, and the product market competition in the 
supplier’s industry to capture a supplier’s dependence on its major customers. To test 
our prediction, we partition our full sample into paired sub-samples, based on the 
median value of the proxy for a supplier’s dependence on its major customers in 2004 
(except the subsamples partitioned based on whether the suppliers are in the durable 
goods industries or not). 
5.1 Subsamples based on suppliers’ sales percentage to major customers 
Once a major customer, who contributes most of a supplier’s sales, falls in 
insolvency, it would be very difficult and costly for the supplier to find another 
potential customer to replace the insolvent customer (Cunat, 2007; Wilner, 2000); 
therefore, the supplier is more willing to help the near-insolvent customer overcome 
temporary financial difficulties. Following Li and Tang (2016), we use the sales 
percentage to major customers as the second proxy of a supplier’s dependence on its 
major customers. As shown in column (1) of Table 7, the coefficient on 
HCEDF*POST is positive (0.0219) and statistically significant at the 1% level for 
suppliers who are more dependent on their near-insolvent customers, while it is 
positive (0.0010) but not significant in column (2), when the near-insolvent customers 
are not the main contributors of the supplier’s sales. Moreover, the difference in the 
coefficient on HCEDF*POST for the two subsamples (0.0219-0.0010=0.0209) is 
significant at less than 1% level (Chi-square = 21.14). These results are consistent 
with our prediction. 
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[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
5.2 Subsamples based on whether the supplier is in a durable industry 
Suppliers that sell durable goods tend to build a long-term relationship with their 
customers, so they are more likely to have significant implicit commitment with 
major customers (Titman and Wessels, 1988). As durable products have longer useful 
lives, suppliers have deep communications with their customers and they know these 
customers better. Once their customers file for bankruptcy and are dissolved, the 
suppliers will bear great loss and it may be very difficult or costly for them to find and 
build new relationships with potential customers. Therefore, we use whether a 
supplier is in a durable goods industry7 as the second proxy for a supplier’s reliance 
on its major customers and partition our sample.  
As reported in Panel A of Table 7, the coefficient on HCEDF*POST is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for suppliers in durable industries (column 
3), but not significant for suppliers in non-durable industries (column 4). The 
difference in the coefficient on HCEDF*POST for the two subsamples is not 
significant at the conventional levels based on two-tailed test (significant at less than 
10% level based on one-tailed test). This result is weaker than the result based on 
sales concentration to customers, but it is still largely consistent with our prediction.  
5.3 Subsamples based on the product market competition in suppliers’ industries 
                              
7 Following Titman and Wessels (1988), industries with SIC codes 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283, 301 or 
324-399 are classified as durable goods industries.  
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If there are many companies in one industry, there will be intense competition 
among them for market shares. Consequently, their customers have many potential 
choices. On the one hand, if a supplier does not extend trade credit to a near-insolvent 
customer, the latter can choose to do business with other suppliers. On the other hand, 
once the distressed customer goes bankrupt, the shrinking customer market means a 
higher degree of product market competition that the supplier will face in the future 
(i.e., the same number of suppliers will fight for fewer customers) (Birge et al., 2014). 
Therefore, suppliers facing a higher degree of product market competition are more 
willing to help their near-insolvent customers. Following Fabbri and Klapper (2016), 
we use the degree of competition in the suppliers’ product market as the third proxy 
for a supplier’s dependence on its major customers. The more competitive a supplier’s 
product market, the more difficult to find and maintain a major customer (i.e., the 
higher switching cost). We use two variables, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of sales 
(HHI_sale) and product market fluidity (Fluidity), to measure the degree of product 
market competition in a supplier’s industry (e.g., Fabbri and Klapper, 2016; Hoberg 
and Phillips, 2010; Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala, 2014). Smaller HHI_sale or larger 
Fluidity indicates a higher degree of product market competition.  
As reported in Panel B of Table 7, the coefficient on HCEDF*POST is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level when suppliers face a higher level of 
product market competition (columns 1 and 3), and it is positive but insignificant 
otherwise (columns 2 and 4). Furthermore, the coefficient on HCEDF*POST is 
significantly higher for the subsample with higher level of product market 
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competition than for the subsample with lower competition (Chi-square = 7.36 for the 
coefficient comparison in columns 1 and 2, and Chi-square = 13.99 for the coefficient 
comparison in columns 3 and 4). These empirical results support our prediction.  
 Taken together, we find consistent results using different measures of suppliers’ 
reliance on customers. Our findings suggest that, after the enactment of BAPCPA, 
whether suppliers offer more trade credit to their near-insolvent customers is 
contingent on their reliance on these customers.      
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine whether the increased supplier protection in bankruptcy 
under BAPCPA induces suppliers to offer more trade credit to near-insolvent 
customers. From a sample of U.S. public firms with available major customer 
information from 2002 to 2008 (excluding 2005 when BAPCPA was enacted), we 
identify suppliers whose major customers are near insolvent (treatment group) and 
suppliers whose major customers are further away from insolvency (control group). 
Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that, after BAPCPA, which 
grants creditors more bargaining power in bankruptcy, suppliers extend more trade 
credit to near-insolvent customers during the ordinary course of business. The parallel 
trend analysis supports our main finding. We also find consistent results using shorter 
or longer event windows, using an alternative measure of bankruptcy risk, and using 
two alternative measures of trade credit. 
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We further explore whether the effect of increased creditor rights on the trade 
credit provision to near-insolvent customers depends on suppliers’ reliance on 
customers, measured by suppliers’ sales concentration to customers, whether 
suppliers are in the durable goods industries, and suppliers’ product market 
competition. Consistent with our prediction, we find that suppliers who are more 
dependent on near-insolvent customers extend more trade credit after BAPCPA.  
 Our findings based on BAPCPA in the U.S. extend the applicable scope of the 
power theory of credit from bank credit to trade credit, namely, in a more 
creditor-oriented environment, unsecured creditors such as suppliers also would like 
to extend more private credit to firms. Moreover, there has been a concern that the 
increased creditor protection under BAPCPA has negative effects on firms filing for 
bankruptcy, while our results suggest that BAPCPA actually benefits near-insolvent 
customers in the ordinary course of business as suppliers are more willing to provide 
trade credit to them, which will likely help them to overcome temporary financial 
difficulties and reduce the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy. Therefore, our findings 
will be of interest not only to academics, but also to stakeholders in the supply chain 
and regulators.   
       30 
References  
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1992). Distribution and growth in models of imperfect 
capital markets. European Economic Review 36, 603-611. 
Aier, J.K., Chen, L., & Pevzner, M. (2014). Debtholders’ Demand for Conservatism: 
Evidence from Changes in Directors’ Fiduciary Duties. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 52, 993-1027. 
Altman, E. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis, and the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23 (4), 589–609. 
Ayotte, K.M., & Morrison, E.R. (2009). Creditor control and conflict in Chapter 11. 
Journal of Legal Analysis 1, 511-551. 
Babich, V., & Tang, C.S. (2012). Managing opportunistic supplier product 
adulteration: Deferred payments, inspection, and combined mechanisms. 
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 14, 301-314. 
Banerjee, S., Dasgupta, S., & Kim, Y. (2008). Buyer–supplier relationships and the 
stakeholder theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 63, 2507–2552. 
Bharath, S.T., & Shumway, T. (2008). Forecasting default with the Merton distance to 
default model. Review of Financial Studies, 21, 1339-1369. 
Biais, B., & Gollier, C. (1997). Trade Credit and Credit Rationing. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 10, 903-937. 
Birge, J., Parker, R., & Yang, S. (2014). Bankruptcy as a competitive strategy: 
Working Paper. 
Bowen, R.M., DuCharme, L., & Shores, D. (1995). Stakeholders' implicit claims and 
accounting method choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 255-295. 
Brennan, M.J., Miksimovic, V., & Zechner, J. (1988). Vendor Financing. The Journal 
of Finance, 43, 1127-1141. 
Burkart, M., & Ellingsen, T. (2004). In-kind finance: A theory of trade credit. The 
American Economic Review, 94, 569-590. 
Campello M, & Gao J. (2017). Customer concentration and loan contract terms. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 123(1), 108-136. 
Campello, M., Gao, J., Qiu, J., & Zhang, Y. (2016). Bankruptcy and the Cost of 
Organized Labor: Evidence from Union Elections. Available at SSRN: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2647614. 
Chod, J. (2017). Inventory, risk shifting, and trade credit. Management Science, 63 (1), 
3207-3225. 
Chod, J., Lyandres, E., & Yang, S.A. (2016). Trade credit and supplier competition. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2849641. 
Coelho, L.M.S. (2010). Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: 
Friend or Foe? Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1747684 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1747684 . 
Cunat, V. (2007). Trade credit: suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers. 
Review of Financial Studies, 20, 491-527. 
Dass, N., Kale, J.R., & Nanda, V. (2015). Trade Credit, Relationship-specific 
Investment, and Product Market Power. Review of Finance, 19, 1867-1923. 
       31 
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 84, 299-329. 
Douglas, M.G. Reclamation rights not extinguished when goods are sold to satisfy 
DIP lender's claims. Jones Day Publications, November/December 2008. Available 
athttp://www.jonesday.com/reclamation-rights-not-extinguished-when-goods-are-s
old-to-satisfy-dip-lenders-claims-12-01-2008/, accessed on August 10, 2017. 
Emery, G.W. (1987). An optimal financial response to variable demand. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 22, 209-225. 
Fabbri, D., & Klapper, L.F. (2016). Bargaining power and trade credit. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 41, 66-80. 
Ferris, J.S. (1981). A transactions theory of trade credit use. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 96, 243-270. 
Fisman, R., & Raturi, M. (2004). Does competition encourage credit provision? 
Evidence from African trade credit relationships. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 86, 345-352. 
Frank, M., & Maksimovic, V. (1998). Trade credit, collateral, and adverse selection. 
Unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland. 
Franks, J.R., Nyborg, K.G., & Torous, W.N. (1996). A comparison of US, UK, and 
German insolvency codes. Financial Management, 25(3), 86-101. 
Giannetti, M., Burkart, M., & Ellingsen, T. (2011). What you sell is what you lend? 
Explaining trade credit contracts. Review of Financial Studies, 24, 1261-1298. 
Hadlock, C.J., & Pierce, J.R. (2010). New evidence on measuring financial 
constraints: Moving beyond the KZ index. Review of Financial Studies, 23(5), 
1909–1940.  
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994). A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human 
capital. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 841-879. 
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1998). Default and renegotiation: A dynamic model of debt. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 1-41. 
Hoberg, G, & Phillips, G. (2010). Product market synergies and competition in 
mergers and acquisitions: A text-based analysis. The Review of Financial Studies, 
23, 3773-3811. 
Hoberg, G, Phillips, G., & Prabhala, N. (2014). Product market threats, payouts, and 
financial flexibility. Journal of Finance, 69, 293-324.  
Huang, H.-W., Dao, M., & Fornaro, J.M. (2016). Corporate governance, SFAS 157 
and cost of equity capital: evidence from US financial institutions. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 46, 141-177. 
Huang, S., Ng, J., Roychowdhury, S., & Sletten, E. (2016). Increased creditor rights, 
institutional investors and corporate myopia. Singapore Management University 
School of Accountancy Research Paper No. 2016-38. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2565590 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565590  
Jensen, M.C., & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 
305-360. 
       32 
Kim, J.-B., Song, B.Y., & Zhang, Y. (2015). Earnings performance of major 
customers and bank loan contracting with suppliers. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
59, 384-398. 
Kim, S.-J., & Shin, H.S. (2012). Sustaining production chains through financial 
linkages. The American Economic Review, 102, 402-406. 
Kouvelis, P., & Zhao, W. (2012). Financing the newsvendor: supplier vs. bank, and 
the structure of optimal trade credit contracts. Operations Research, 60, 566-580. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008). The economic 
consequences of legal origins. Journal of Economic Literature, 46, 285-332. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1998). Law and 
finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
Lee, Y.W., & Stowe, J.D. (1993). Product risk, asymmetric information, and trade 
credit. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28, 285-300. 
Li, J.Y., & Tang, D.Y. (2016). The leverage externalities of credit default swaps. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 120, 491-513. 
Lian, Y. (2017). Financial distress and customer-supplier relationships. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 43: 397-406. 
Long, M.S., Malitz, I.B., & Ravid, S.A. (1993). Trade credit, quality guarantees, and 
product marketability. Financial Management, 22 (4), 117-127. 
Love I, Preve L A, & Sarria-Allende V. (2007). Trade credit and bank credit: 
Evidence from recent financial crises. Journal of Financial Economics, 83(2), 
453-469. 
Mazur, J. (2014). Can stricter bankruptcy laws discipline capital investment? 
Evidence from the US airline industry. Working paper, Duke University. 
McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (1999). Interfirm relationships and informal credit in 
Vietnam. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 1285-1320. 
Merton, R.C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest 
rates. The Journal of Finance, 29, 449-470. 
Miller, H.R. (2007). Chapter 11 in transition-from boom to bust and into the future. 
American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 81, 375. 
Moore, G. H. Business cycle indicators. Vol. 1. No. 10. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1961. 
Ng, C.K., Smith, J.K., & Smith, R.L. (1999). Evidence on the determinants of credit 
terms used in interfirm trade. The Journal of Finance, 54 (3), 1109-1129. 
Petersen, M.A., & Rajan, R.G. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence 
from small business data. The Journal of Finance, 49, 3-37. 
Petersen, M.A., & Rajan, R.G. (1997). Trade credit: theories and evidence. Review of 
Financial Studies, 10, 661-691. 
Rajan, R.G., & Zingales, L. (1993). Financial dependence and growth. The American 
Economic Review, 88, 559-586. 
Ravid, S.A., & Sundgren, S. (1998). The comparative efficiency of small-firm 
bankruptcies: A study of the US and Finnish bankruptcy codes. Available at 
SSRN:https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297763. 
       33 
Smith, J.K. (1987). Trade credit and informational asymmetry. The Journal of 
Finance, 42, 863-872. 
Tabb, C. J. (2016). Law of Bankruptcy. Fourth edition. Hornbook Series. West 
Publishing Corporation, U.S.A. 
Teloni, F. (2014). The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: 
An Empirical Examination of the Act's Business Bankruptcy Effects. American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal, 88, 237. 
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The 
Journal of Finance, 43, 1-19. 
Townsend, R.M. (1979). Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state 
verification. Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 265-293. 
Williams, J.F. (2009). American bankruptcy institute media teleconference to 
examine the future of real estate industry distress. American Bankruptcy Institute 
Law Review, 17, 121. 
Wilner, B.S. (2000). The exploitation of relationships in financial distress: The case of 
trade credit. The Journal of Finance, 55, 153-178. 
Yang, S.A., & Birge, J.R. (2011). Trade credit in supply chains: multiple creditors and 
priority rules. Available at SSRN: https: // papers. ssrn. Com /sol3/papers. cfm? 
abstract_id =1840663. 
Yang, S.A., Birge, J.R., & Parker R.P. (2015). The supply chain effects of bankruptcy. 
Management Science, 61(10), 2320-2338. 
  
       34 
Appendix A Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
TC Accounts receivable divided by sales (RECT/SALE). 
TC1 Accounts receivable divided by total assets (RECT/AT). 
NTCS Difference between accounts receivable and accounts payable divided by 
total assets ((RECT-AP)/AT)  
EDF Expected Default Frequency. It is defined as the probability that the firm 
value will fall below the value of debt, i.e., the probability of bankruptcy 
over the next year. Following Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) method, we 
calculate quarterly EDF based on the Black-Scholes-Merton option 
valuation model, and then calculate the arithmetic mean of four quarters’ 
EDF for each year. 
CEDF The weighted average EDF of each supplier’s major customers, where the 
weight is a major customer’s purchase from the supplier divided by the 
supplier’s total sales. 
HCEDF Indicator variable that equals 1 if a supplier’s CEDF score in 2004 is in the 
top quintile, and 0 if a supplier’s CEDF score in 2004 is in the bottom 
quintile.  
Size The natural logarithm of total assets (AT).  
Leverage  Sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt divided by total assets 
((DLC+DLTT)/AT).   
Profitability EBIT divided by sales. 
Cashhold Cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets (CHE/AT). 
TC_ap Accounts payable divided by cost of goods sold (AP/COGS).  
RD Research and development expense divided by sales (XRD/SALE).  
Tangibility Net PPE divided by total assets (PPENT/AT). 
HP HP index = -0.737*Size_hp + 0.043*Size_hp^2 - 0.04*Age_hp (Hadlock 
and Pierce, 2010; Chod et al., 2016). Size_hp: book assets, inflation 
adjusted to 2004 and capped at $4.5 billion; Age_hp: firm age, capped at 
37. 
Rating An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm’s Standard & Poors long-term 
credit rating is BB- or above, and 0 otherwise. 
LnAge The natural logarithm of one plus firm age. 
Dividend Dividends per share divided by the stock price at the fiscal year end 
(DVPSX_F/ PRCC_F). 
MB Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of asset, minus prefer/common share value, then divided by total 
assets ((CSHO*PRCC_F+AT-CEQ)/AT) (Campello and Gao, 2017). 
Growth_sale Sales in the current year minus sales in the previous year, then divided by 
sales in the previous year.  
Z-Score Altman’s (1968) Z-Score, calculated as 1.2 × (Current Assets - Current 
Liabilities) / Total Assets + 1.4 × Retained Earning/Total Assets + 3.3 × 
EBIT/Total Assets + 0.6 × Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities + 0.99 × 
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Sales/Total Assets. 
CZscore The weighted average Z-Score of each supplier’s major customers, where 
the weight is a major customer’s purchase from the supplier divided by the 
supplier’s total sales. 
HCZscore Indicator variable that equals 1 if a supplier’s CZscore in 2004 is in the top 
quintile, and 0 if a supplier’s CZscore in 2004 is in the bottom quintile. 
Post Indicator variable that equals 1 for the post-BAPCPA period, and 0 for the 
pre-BAPCPA period.  
YEAR_2003 Indicator variable that equals 1 for year 2003, and 0 otherwise. 
YEAR_2004 Indicator variable that equals 1 for year 2004, and 0 otherwise. 
YEAR_2006 Indicator variable that equals 1 for year 2006, and 0 otherwise. 
YEAR_2007 Indicator variable that equals 1 for year 2007, and 0 otherwise. 
YEAR_2008 Indicator variable that equals 1 for year 2008, and 0 otherwise. 
HHI_sale The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of sales by industry (Fama-French 12 
industries). 
Fluidity A measure of how intensively the product market around a firm is changing 
in each year based on text-based analysis of firm 10-K product descriptions 
(Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala, 2014); available at 
http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/industryconcen.htm. 
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Table 1 Sample distribution  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 Total  % 
Consumer Non-Durables 24 26 26 26 23 22 147 9.60% 
Consumer Durables  17 18 20 20 19 18 112 7.32% 
Manufacturing  43 43 45 44 43 40 258 16.85% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction 
and Products 
10 11 12 12 11 11 67 4.38% 
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
10 10 11 11 10 10 62 4.05% 
Business Equipment  93 95 99 99 91 81 558 36.45% 
Telephone and Television 
Transmission 
5 5 5 5 5 4 29 1.89% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some 
Services 
6 7 7 7 7 6 40 2.61% 
Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs 
24 25 26 26 21 19 141 9.21% 
Other  19 20 22 22 18 16 117 7.64% 
Total 251 260 273 272 248 227 1,531 100% 
This table presents the industry distribution of our sample. We use Fama-French 12 industry 
classifications. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Min. p25 p50 p75 Max. 
TC 1,531 0.152 0.082 0.000 0.103 0.139 0.184 0.543 
HCEDF 1,531 0.485 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Size 1,531 5.285 2.078 1.059 3.770 5.088 6.718 9.822 
Profitability 1,531 -0.236 1.181 -9.404 -0.084 0.040 0.106 0.425 
Leverage 1,531 0.219 0.252 0.000 0.006 0.132 0.325 0.966 
Cashhold 1,531 0.230 0.236 0.000 0.037 0.132 0.387 0.875 
TC_ap 1,531 0.171 0.214 0.014 0.075 0.116 0.179 1.481 
RD 1,531 0.495 4.386 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.151 81.006 
Tangibility 1,531 0.229 0.202 0.006 0.076 0.170 0.321 0.895 
HP 1,531 -3.168 0.799 -4.638 -3.627 -3.181 -2.692 -0.454 
Rating 1,531 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LnAge 1,531 2.749 0.695 0.693 2.197 2.639 3.367 4.060 
Dividend 1,531 0.008 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.406 
MB 1,531 2.030 1.557 0.551 1.143 1.552 2.381 10.125 
Growth_sale 1,531 0.134 0.440 -0.662 -0.056 0.066 0.222 2.617 
 
Panel B Univariate Comparison 
 
 Pre-BAPCPA  Post-BAPCPA   
 
Control 
(n=405) 
Treat 
(n=379) Diff. 
 Control 
(n=384) 
Treat 
(n=363) Diff. 
 
Diff. in Diff. 
TC 0.1494 0.1564 0.007  0.1384 0.1666 0.0282***  0.021** 
Size 5.2723 5.0296 -0.2427  5.6097 5.2218 -0.3879**  -0.145 
Profitability -0.1635 -0.4219 -0.2584***  -0.1326 -0.234 -0.1014  0.132 
Leverage 0.2007 0.2115 0.0109  0.2225 0.2432 0.0208  0.010 
Cashhold 0.1928 0.2986 0.1058***  0.1695 0.2654 0.0960***  -0.010 
TC_ap 0.1739 0.1712 -0.0027  0.1642 0.1763 0.0121  0.015 
RD 0.3507 0.7617 0.411  0.2314 0.6546 0.4233  0.423 
Tangibility  0.2485 0.2236 -0.0249*  0.2356 0.2051 -0.0306**  -0.006 
HP -3.1946 -3.0866 0.1080*  -3.266 -3.12 0.1460**  0.038 
Rating 0.2222 0.1108 -0.1114***  0.2422 0.0799 -0.1623***  -0.051 
lnAge 2.6856 2.5473 -0.1383***  2.9449 2.8215 -0.1234***  0.015 
Dividend 0.0063 0.0067 0.0005  0.0112 0.0071 -0.0041*  -0.005 
MB 2.0675 2.1065 0.039  2.0776 1.8567 -0.2209**  -0.260 
Growth_sale 0.1557 0.1307 -0.0251  0.1185 0.1284 0.0098  0.035 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of main variables. Panel B reports the univariate comparison 
between the treatment group and control group in the pre- (2002-2004) and post-BAPCPA (2006-2008) 
periods. All variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote the significance level at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed t-statistics. 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A.TC 1                
B.POST -0.004 1               
C.HCEDF 0.105 0.003 1              
D.Size -0.144 0.064 -0.075 1             
E.Profitability -0.099 0.045 -0.077 0.138 1            
F.Leverage -0.173 0.053 0.031 0.205 0.007 1           
G.Cashhold 0.064 -0.059 0.214 -0.243 -0.298 -0.437 1          
H.TC_ap 0.234 -0.006 0.011 -0.133 -0.202 -0.02 0.072 1         
I.RD 0.022 -0.013 0.047 0.014 -0.656 0.018 0.174 -0.009 1        
J.Tangibility -0.166 -0.039 -0.069 0.265 0.086 0.275 -0.443 0.029 -0.024 1       
K.HP 0.144 -0.033 0.079 -0.812 -0.210 -0.144 0.293 0.249 0.013 -0.287 1      
L.Rating -0.148 -0.007 -0.183 0.626 0.133 0.129 -0.311 0.000 -0.048 0.204 -0.468 1     
M.LnAge -0.161 0.191 -0.094 0.192 0.167 0.066 -0.311 -0.19 -0.049 0.186 -0.63 0.216 1    
N.Dividend 0.009 0.03 -0.02 0.075 0.017 0.027 -0.041 -0.026 -0.016 0.03 -0.098 0.087 0.085 1   
O.MB 0.073 -0.037 -0.028 -0.253 -0.187 -0.181 0.258 0.286 0.035 -0.161 0.343 -0.11 -0.191 -0.066 1  
P.Growth_sale 0.173 -0.023 -0.009 -0.015 0.016 -0.071 0.072 0.093 -0.053 -0.03 0.056 -0.05 -0.118 -0.055 0.201 1 
This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix of key variables. All numbers in bold indicate correlations significant at the 5% level or less.    
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Table 4 Effect of BAPCPA on the trade credit supply to near-insolvent customers 
 
 Prediction (1) (2) 
HCEDF*POST + 0.0151*** 0.0145*** 
  (4.23) (3.84) 
Size +  0.0076 
   (0.59) 
Profitability +/-  -0.0022 
   (-0.47) 
Leverage -  -0.0255 
   (-1.68) 
Cashhold +/-  -0.1534*** 
   (-5.30) 
TC_ap +  0.1012** 
   (3.11) 
RD +  -0.0013*** 
   (-4.69) 
Tangibility +/-  -0.0816 
   (-1.41) 
HP -  -0.0216 
   (-0.62) 
Rating +  -0.0063 
   (-0.92) 
LnAge +  0.0108 
   (0.51) 
Dividend +  0.0789** 
   (2.52) 
MB +  0.0030** 
   (2.29) 
Growth_sale +  0.0051 
   (1.51) 
Constant  0.1495*** 0.0570 
  (29.79) (1.08) 
Year FE & Firm FE  YES YES 
N  1,531  1,531  
Adjusted R-square  1.3% 18.6% 
This table reports the OLS regression results of estimating whether suppliers provide more trade 
creditor to near-insolvent customers after BAPCPA. The sample period is from 2002 to 2008 
(excluding 2005 - the year when BAPCPA went into effect). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
The t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 
significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed t-statistics. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and industry-level (Fama-French 12 industries) clustering. 
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Table 5 Parallel Trend Analysis 
 
 (1) 
HCEDF*YEAR_2003 0.0033 
 (0.28) 
HCEDF* YEAR_2004 -0.0061 
 (-0.61) 
HCEDF* YEAR_2006 0.0102** 
 (2.28) 
HCEDF* YEAR_2007 0.0160** 
 (2.78) 
HCEDF* YEAR_2008 0.0146 
 (1.73) 
Size 0.0075 
 (0.55) 
Profitability -0.0021 
 (-0.44) 
Leverage -0.0255 
 (-1.73) 
Cashhold -0.1531*** 
 (-5.34) 
TC_ap 0.1012** 
 (3.10) 
RD -0.0013*** 
 (-4.68) 
Tangibility -0.0814 
 (-1.41) 
HP -0.0216 
 (-0.60) 
Rating -0.0067 
 (-1.02) 
LnAge 0.0107 
 (0.51) 
Dividend 0.0812** 
 (2.57) 
MB 0.0031** 
 (2.39) 
Growth_sale 0.0052 
 (1.55) 
Constant 0.0579 
 (1.09) 
Year FE & Firm FE YES 
N 1531 
Adjusted R-square 18.5% 
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This table presents the parallel trend analysis for the treatment and control groups during the sample 
period 2002-2008 (excluding 2005 - the year when BAPCPA went into effect). The holdout/benchmark 
group is year 2002. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, 
based on two-tailed t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and industry-level 
(Fama-French 12 industries) clustering. 
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Table 6 Robustness checks  
Panel A Alternative Sample Periods 
 One-year window Two-year window Four-year window 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HCEDF*POST 0.0114* 0.0157* 0.0184*** 
 (1.90) (2.19) (3.58) 
Size 0.0086 0.0085 -0.0049 
 (0.29) (0.52) (-0.36) 
Profitability 0.0077* 0.0046 -0.0061* 
 (1.87) (1.31) (-2.26) 
Leverage -0.0100 0.0092 -0.0205** 
 (-0.25) (0.36) (-2.58) 
Cashhold -0.0450 -0.1129** -0.1405*** 
 (-0.72) (-3.02) (-6.84) 
TC_ap 0.0265 0.0709 0.1016*** 
 (0.84) (1.74) (6.87) 
RD -0.0059*** -0.0020*** -0.0016*** 
 (-24.68) (-7.79) (-3.90) 
Tangibility -0.1050 -0.0628 -0.0873 
 (-0.65) (-0.50) (-1.52) 
HP 0.0017 -0.0399 -0.0484 
 (0.04) (-1.72) (-1.51) 
Rating 0.0009 -0.0027 -0.0003 
 (0.06) (-0.37) (-0.05) 
LnAge 0.0014 -0.0140 -0.0039 
 (0.04) (-0.67) (-0.19) 
Dividend -0.2804 0.1489 0.0511* 
 (-1.56) (1.09) (1.89) 
MB -0.0103*** 0.0004 0.0045* 
 (-3.82) (0.19) (2.02) 
Growth_sale 0.0115 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (0.70) (-0.27) (-0.31) 
Constant 0.1738 0.0507 0.0682 
 (1.66) (0.72) (1.68) 
N 540 1042 
 
1989 
Year FE & Firm FE YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-square 30.5% 17.8% 16.4% 
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Panel B Alternative measures of proximity to insolvency and trade credit 
 TC TC1 NTCS 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
HCZscore*POST 0.0186**   
 (2.33)   
HCEDF*POST  0.0135*** 0.0139** 
  (3.27) (2.27) 
Size -0.0242*** 0.0022 0.0077 
 (-4.16) (0.25) (1.22) 
Profitability 0.0102** 0.0115*** 0.0138*** 
 (2.86) (3.83) (3.84) 
Leverage -0.0297 -0.0328 -0.0439*** 
 (-1.27) (-1.50) (-3.40) 
Cashhold -0.1429*** -0.2286*** -0.1256*** 
 (-10.31) (-7.01) (-5.51) 
TC_ap -0.0266* -0.0153  
 (-1.86) (-0.48)  
RD 0.0000 0.0013** 0.0007 
 (0.02) (2.70) (1.43) 
Tangibility -0.1076* -0.1564* -0.0919 
 (-2.05) (-2.05) (-1.61) 
HP -0.0072 0.0833* 0.0050 
 (-0.28) (2.20) (0.14) 
Rating 0.0003 -0.0035 -0.0075 
 (0.07) (-0.47) (-0.71) 
LnAge -0.0088 0.0108 0.0102 
 (-0.58) (0.39) (0.55) 
Dividend 0.0332 0.0477 0.0417* 
 (0.56) (1.79) (2.26) 
MB 0.0025 0.0073*** 0.0001 
 (1.08) (3.98) (0.06) 
Growth_sale 0.0088 0.0122*** 0.0053 
 (1.29) (6.10) (0.82) 
Constant 0.3498*** 0.4649*** 0.0768 
 (3.30) (4.07) (1.05) 
Year FE & Firm FE YES YES YES 
N 1694 1531 1531 
Adjusted R-square 14.7% 28.0% 11.6% 
Panel A reports the OLS regression results using three alternative sample periods: 2004-2006 (one-year 
window pre- and post-BAPCPA) in column (1), 2003-2007 (two-year window pre- and post-BAPCPA) 
in column (2), and 2001-2009 (four-year window pre- and post-BAPCPA) in column (3) (excluding 
2005 in all sample periods). Column (1) of Panel B reports the OLS regression results using an 
alternative measure of customers’ proximity to insolvency for the sample period 2002-2008 (excluding 
2005). HCZscore is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a supplier’s 2004 weighted average customer 
z-score (CZscore) is in the top quintile, and 0 if a supplier’s 2004 CZscore is in the bottom quintile. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B report the results using two alternative measures of trade credit, TC1 
and NTCS, respectively, for the sample period 2002-2008 (excluding 2005). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** 
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denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively, based on two-tailed t-statistics. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and industry-level (Fama-French 12 industries) clustering. 
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Table 7 Cross-Sectional Analyses: The effect of suppliers’ reliance on customers 
 
Panel A Percentage of sales to major customers, and durable versus non-durable industries 
 
 
Percentage of sales to major 
customers  
Durable vs. Non-durable 
goods industries 
 High Low Durable Non-durable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HCEDF*POST 0.0219*** 0.0010 0.0196*** 0.0075 
 (5.26) (0.29) (4.21) (1.46) 
Size -0.0062 0.0129** -0.0248 0.0257*** 
 (-0.17) (2.47) (-0.77) (8.40) 
Profitability 0.0007 0.0033 0.0049 -0.0085 
 (0.27) (0.62) (1.29) (-1.04) 
Leverage -0.0431** -0.0173* -0.0308 -0.0335 
 (-2.33) (-2.07) (-1.86) (-1.51) 
Cashhold -0.1540** -0.1417** -0.1612** -0.1403*** 
 (-3.25) (-2.94) (-3.63) (-5.56) 
TC_ap 0.0678* 0.1544** 0.0918* 0.0868* 
 (1.92) (2.86) (2.54) (2.21) 
RD -0.0014*** 0.0124*** -0.0011*** 0.0101*** 
 (-3.58) (5.83) (-13.60) (3.86) 
Tangibility -0.0637 -0.1397*** -0.1127 -0.0846 
 (-0.81) (-3.39) (-1.90) (-1.00) 
HP -0.0719 -0.0073 -0.0977 0.0050 
 (-0.72) (-0.35) (-1.06) (0.42) 
Rating -0.0101 0.0089 0.0069 -0.0223* 
 (-1.08) (0.49) (0.94) (-1.95) 
LnAge 0.0117 0.0097 -0.0202 0.0364* 
 (0.42) (0.78) (-0.72) (2.11) 
Dividend 0.1398** 0.0617** 0.0912 0.0264 
 (3.03) (2.71) (1.91) (0.70) 
MB 0.0041 -0.0007 0.0021 0.0021 
 (1.52) (-0.43) (0.76) (1.31) 
Growth_sale 0.0080* -0.0050 0.0037 0.0036 
 (1.88) (-1.16) (0.63) (0.82) 
Constant -0.0029 0.0666 0.0943 -0.0361 
 (-0.02) (1.16) (1.05) (-0.54) 
Year FE & Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
N 743 788 857 674 
Adjusted R-square 15.5% 36.5% 17.7% 31.2% 
Chi-square 21.14 (p = 0.00)  2.27 (p = 0.13) 
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Panel B Product market competition in suppliers’ industries 
 
 HHI_sale  Fluidity  
 High Competition Low Competition High Competition Low Competition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HCEDF*POST 0.0223*** 0.0019 0.0231*** 0.0040 
 (11.97) (0.26) (4.63) (0.81) 
Size 0.0057 -0.0087 0.0085 0.0073 
 (0.44) (-0.27) (0.38) (0.95) 
Profitability 0.0064 0.0012 -0.0036 0.0290* 
 (0.55) (0.50) (-0.72) (1.98) 
Leverage -0.0152 -0.0482** -0.0383 -0.0036 
 (-0.57) (-3.34) (-1.32) (-0.57) 
Cashhold -0.1234* -0.1728*** -0.1576*** -0.1006* 
 (-3.14) (-4.23) (-5.61) (-2.05) 
TC_ap 0.1092 0.0746** 0.0876** 0.2324*** 
 (2.44) (2.47) (2.62) (5.32) 
RD 0.0166* -0.0013** -0.0014*** 0.0634* 
 (3.37) (-3.40) (-4.97) (2.21) 
Tangibility -0.0880 -0.1088*** -0.0592 -0.1076 
 (-0.73) (-3.52) (-1.01) (-1.40) 
HP -0.0308 -0.0664 -0.0202 -0.0087 
 (-1.25) (-0.76) (-0.37) (-0.55) 
Rating 0.0100 -0.0169 -0.0236** 0.0031 
 (0.78) (-1.52) (-2.65) (0.45) 
LnAge 0.0235 -0.0185 0.0103 0.0056 
 (1.00) (-0.49) (0.48) (0.60) 
Dividend 0.0808 0.0500 0.0965* 0.0316** 
 (1.77) (1.48) (2.03) (2.50) 
MB 0.0000 0.0032 0.0033* 0.0027 
 (0.02) (1.15) (1.85) (1.06) 
Growth_sale 0.0023 0.0051 0.0070 -0.0053 
 (0.92) (0.71) (1.48) (-0.82) 
Constant 0.0059 0.0958 0.0895 0.0581 
 (0.06) (1.08) (1.24) (1.27) 
Year FE & Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
N 822 709 817 714 
Adjusted R-square 29.1% 16.2% 17.7% 28.9% 
Chi-square 7.36 (p = 0.01) 
 
13.99 (p=0.00) 
This table reports the OLS regression results of testing whether the increased creditor rights under 
BAPCPA on trade credit supply to near-insolvent customers is dependent on suppliers’ reliance on 
their customers. We partition our full sample into paired sub-samples, based on the median value of 
proxies for a supplier’s dependence on its major customers in 2004 (except the subsamples partitioned 
based on whether the suppliers are in the durable goods industries or not). Panel A reports the 
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regressions results for the subsamples partitioned on percentage of sales to major customers, and 
whether the suppliers are in durable or non-durable industries. Panel B reports the regression results 
for the subsamples partitioned on the level of market competition in suppliers’ industries (Low value 
of HHI_sale and high value of Fluidity indicate high degree of product market competition). All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on 
two-tailed t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and industry-level 
(Fama-French 12 industries) clustering. 
 
 
